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TO HOLD AND BEAR ARMS: THE ENGLISH PERSPECTIVE
LOIS G. SCHWOERER*
INTRODUCTION
For the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Second
Amendment to our Constitution has attracted increasing attention
from the general public, legal commentators, and historians of
colonial and early national American history. As incidents of gun
violence have multiplied, and the public has become polarized into
groups that favor gun control versus those who believe in a
constitutional right of the individual to own guns, academics have
enlarged their efforts to discover exactly what the intentions of our
forefathers were in writing the Second Amendment and precisely
what that awkwardly worded amendment meant. Interest in the
English background to the Second Amendment was only marginal for
a time, but it has grown as the debate hardened. In the 1970s and
1980s several historians and legal commentators wrote about the
English origins of the Second Amendment, but their essays met
largely with indifference or criticism.1
Then, in 1994, Joyce Lee Malcolm, an American professor
specializing in English history who teaches at Bentley College in
* Elmer Louis Kayser Professor Emeritus of History at George Washington University.
I owe thanks to many people. Charlene Bangs Bickford, Kenneth Bowling, Catherine A. Cline,
Robert J. Frankle, Eliga Gould, Howard Nenner, John G.A. Pocock, Barbara Taft, and Melinda
Zook offered advice and comment, not all of which I followed. Michael Bellesiles, Carl Bogus,
Mark Goldie, Janelle Greenberg, and Linda Levy Peck also talked with me about the English
perspective on guns. I am also indebted (as always) to the staff at the Folger Shakespeare
Library in Washington, D.C., especially to Georgiana Spiegal, and to the staff at the Library of
Congress, especially Bruce Martin, and the librarians in the Rare Book Room and the Law
Library there. I cheerfully declare that errors that remain are my own.
1. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984); Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community: The
Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22, 22-42 (1984); Robert E.
Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599, 599-614
(1982); Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the
Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 961-1001 (1975). These essays varied in
merit. For a measured but critical review, see Joyce Lee Malcolm, Book Review, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 452 (1986) (reviewing STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED:
THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984)).
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Massachusetts, recast and enlarged her early work into a book
entitled To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American
Right, which Harvard University Press published. 2 In this book
Malcolm presented three major ideas: First, that the old medieval
English duty of service in the militia and in the posse comitatus,
imposed theoretically on all males between the age of sixteen and
sixty, was transformed at the time of England's Glorious Revolution
in 1688-89 into an individual right to keep and bear arms. She
maintained that Article VII of the Declaration of Rights, 1689 (better
known as the Bill of Rights, its statutory form) secured that right,
writing unguardedly that the Convention-that is, the irregularly
elected body that drew up the Declaration of Rights- "came down
squarely, and exclusively, in favour of an individual right to have arms
for self-defence." 3 Second, to explain the undeniable restrictions on
the possession of arms in Article VII, Malcolm declared that the
restrictions were not really intended and that eighteenth-century
legislation, court interpretation, and learned comment clarified the
intended meaning of the arms article and that by the end of the
century it was generally agreed that all Protestants had the right to
arms.4 Third, turning to colonial America, Malcolm asserted that
Article VII was an English legacy that influenced the American
drafters of the Second Amendment, who, however, broadened the
legacy, sweeping aside "limitations" upon the individual right to
possess arms.' In brief concluding remarks, Professor Malcolm
commented on the fate of Article VII in the next centuries, regretting
that although many people wanted to reaffirm it, it was "gently...
teased from public use" leaving the British people exposed to danger.6
This provocative and confidently written book provoked great
interest and warm approval. At the present time, To Keep and Bear
Arms plays an important role in discussions of the meaning of the
Second Amendment. My essay, however, contests its thesis, attempts
to show why it is unacceptable, and offers a reading of the evidence
and of the nature of late-seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century
English society and thought that is different from that of Professor
Malcolm.
2. JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT (1994).
3. Id. at 119-20.
4. See id. at 123,128, 129, 134, 138.
5. See id. at 151,153, 161,162, 163.
6. Id. at 165, 176.
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To dissent from Malcolm's interpretation, some might say, is
foolhardy. After all, her book was enthusiastically received by
American historians, legal commentators, and the gun community.7
Lengthy reviews, warmly praising it, poured from American law
journals, including those of the highest reputation. Her argument has
been described as "irrefutable," her research in political and legal
history as "meticulous," her book as a "foundational text" of the so-
called "standard modelers."8  Predictably, the National Rifle
Association promoted the book, and the reviews in its journal were
especially enthusiastic.9 Less predictably, indeed rather surprisingly,
the book found favor with the Bench: Supreme Court Justice
Anthony Scalia described it as "an excellent study," and Judge
Samuel Cummings of the Fifth Circuit Court in Texas, famous for his
ruling in the United States v. Emerson case, cited Malcolm's book in
asserting that the right to bear arms was a legacy of the English Bill of
Rights.10 It has been noticed that no scholar has challenged Malcolm
in print." That is, strictly speaking, not true, but it is true that of the
formal published reviews, only two-one of them by me-expressed
reservations about the thesis and the scholarship 12 and only two other
historians have negatively criticized Malcolm's study in print. 3 In
short, Malcolm's thesis has been widely accepted; in some circles it
enjoys the status of dogma respecting the English origins of the
Second Amendment.
Professor Malcolm asserts that she is an historian, not an
advocate, and that she is asking only for a "decent respect" for the
7. Of the two printed reviews in English journals, one was an excursus about guns and
crime in English society without critical comment on Malcolm's book. See David Wootton,
Disarming the English, LONDON REV. BOOKS, July 21, 1994, at 20. The other, by an American
in the "Briefly Noted" section of the journal, was a restatement of Malcolm's thesis, again
without critical comment. See Eliga Gould, Book Review, 111 ENG. HIST. REV. 1290, 1290
(1996).
8. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE L.J.
995, 1013 (1995) (book review); David B. Kopel, It Isn't About Duck Hunting: The British
Origins of the Right To Arms, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1352 (1995) (book review); Chris
Mooney, Liberal Legal Scholars Are Supporting the Right to Bear Arms. But Will Historians
Shoot Them Down?, LINGUA FRANCA, Feb. 2000, at 27, 28.
9. See WAYNE LAPIERRE, GUNS, CRIME AND FREEDOM 14-15 (1994); Book Review,
AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1994, at 27. Both the book by LaPierre and the book review were cited in
Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309, 376
n.318 (1998).
10. Mooney, supra note 8, at 31.
11. See Kopel, supra note 8, at 1352.
12. See Michael A. Bellesiles, Book Review, 14 L. & HIST. REV. 382, 383-84 (1996); Lois
G. Schwoerer, Book Review, 61 J.S. HIST. 570, 570-71 (1995).
13. See Bogus, supra note 9, at 406 n.502; Garry Wills, Why We Have No Right to Keep and
Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, at 62, 66.
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past.14 I, too, lay claim to the high calling of historian and with
Malcolm believe that knowledge of history is of great value deserving
of "decent respect" and more. I suspect that all historians would
agree that it is no simple matter to research some historical problem
or other, build one's understanding of it on verifiable sources, and
present one's account and interpretation with such clarity, grace, and
unambiguous evidence as to convince and delight the reader.
Historians understand, as sometimes students and lay persons forget,
that evidence does not always say the same thing to everyone;
different people of good will may interpret it differently. It does not
follow, however, that every interpretation is as accurate as every
other one. As Michael Dorf remarks in his essay in this collection,
"In the end, a satisfying interpretation is not so much one that earns
the highest composite score on the relevant factors, nor even one that
prevails in a trumping category, but one that best hangs together."' 5
In my view, an issue is more likely to yield its meaning when the
words used are dissected in terms of their contemporary signification,
when the political, ideological and socioeconomic context is analyzed,
the persons playing a role in it are examined, and the evidence is
contemporary and verifiable. 6 These steps are especially important
when the evidence is not as full as one would wish, as is the case with
the passage of the Declaration of Rights. Unchallenged, or in the two
negative reviews challenged necessarily only briefly, Malcolm's thesis
has become received wisdom through the circularity of positive
comment. To challenge that thesis by offering a different
interpretation will, I hope, clarify not only the intellectual and
constitutional antecedents but also cast some light on the meaning of
the much-disputed Second Amendment to our Constitution.
I
Professor Malcolm's statement and practice suggest that she is an
originalist; in other words, that she believes in the overriding
importance of the original meaning of the English and American Bill
of Rights. 7 I will follow her in this by presenting my understanding of
14. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 177.
15. Michael Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV.
291, 293 (2000).
16. See, for example, the classic study, H. BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF
HISTORY (AMS Press 1978) (1931), and many articles by Quentin Skinner, among them
Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts, 3 NEW LITERARY HIST. 393, 393-408 (1972).
17. See MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 176, ch. 7.
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the drafters' intentions and the resultant meaning of Article VII of
the Declaration/Bill of Rights, 1689.18
It was a tactical victory for the supporters of a claim of rights that
a list of thirteen rights was included in the Declaration of Rights
along with the offer of the throne to Prince William and Princess
Mary of Orange and the other terms of the Settlement. 19  To
underscore its importance, the Declaration of Rights was carried in a
magnificent procession on February 13, 1689 from Westminster Hall
to the Banqueting Hall and presented to Prince William and Princess
Mary in an elaborate ceremony, events later memorialized in prints.20
In December 1689, the Declaration was transformed into a statute,
known to this day as the Bill of Rights, a legal process that endowed
all its provisions with statutory authority.21 The fact that Article VII
was a part of the document that presented the terms settling the
revolutionary crisis no doubt elevated its political importance, and the
fact that the Declaration of Rights was transformed into a statute of
course gave all the articles statutory authority.
As one might expect, the Declaration of Rights took some days
to draft, and over a two-week period the entire document, including
Article VII, underwent significant amendment. The process began on
29 January 1689, when Anthony Cary, Lord Falkland, a Tory, urged
the House of Commons not to think about filling the throne until they
had decided, "what Power... [to] give the King ... and what not. 22
In ways suggestive of the politics that surrounded the passage of the
American Bill of Rights, Falkland's initiative concealed a Tory effort
to delay a decision on filling the throne by embarrassing and
deflecting the attention of Whigs who might be expected to agree to
the idea of a statement of rights.2' Following a lengthy debate in
which objections were aired24 and grievances canvassed, the
Commons concurred with Falkland's proposal and appointed a thirty-
18. A copy of the Declaration of Rights of 1689 may be conveniently found in LOIS G.
SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 295 (1981).
19. See id. at 19, 234.
20. There are three undated prints of the presentation ceremony, none of which is
contemporary, in the Print Room of the British Museum.
21. See SCHWOERER, supra note 18, at 267.
22. 9 ANCHITELL GREY, DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FROM THE YEAR 1667
TO THE YEAR 1694, at 30 (London, 1763).
23. See SCHWOERER, supra note 18, at 185-90; Kenneth R. Bowling, "A Tub to the Whale":
The Founding Fathers and Adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 223,
223-51(1988). See generally SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND
THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA 1788-1828 (1999).
24. See SCHWOERER, supra note 18, at 195-97.
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nine-member committee,25 the "rights committee," dominated by
Whig members, to prepare a report.
Prominent among the many grievances mentioned in debate
were a standing army in peacetime without parliament's consent and
the use of the militia (under the command of the king) to disarm and
imprison men without cause. Members of the House of Commons,
who for years had harangued against these issues, came forward. For
example, Sir Richard Temple declared that it was essential to
"provide against a standing army without consent of Parliament" in
peacetime.26 Serjeant John Maynard denounced the Militia Act and
bitterly complained that it was "[a]n abominable thing to disarm the
nation, to set up a standing army. '27 Amplifying the point, Hugh
Boscawen said, "The Militia, under pretence of persons disturbing the
government, disarmed and imprisoned men without cause: I myself
was so dealt with." '
But no one urged in this or any other debate that the individual
had a right to bear arms. Professor Malcolm argues to the contrary,
basing her view on elliptically reported comments by a Tory, the
Honorable Heneage Finch, in the debate on 28 January 1689.
According to notes taken by John Somers (used by Malcolm), Finch
said, "The constitution being limited there is a good foundation for
defensive arms-It has given us right to demand full and ample
security. '29 On those grounds Malcolm asserted that Finch "pressed"
the "need for the private possession of weapons to restrain the
Crown."30  In my judgment, her reading of these words is
unacceptable.
Three separate accounts of this debate have survived: one is by
Somers, 31 a second by Anchitell Grey, who recorded parliamentary
25. Two days later the committee was enlarged to forty members.
26. 9 GREY, supra note 22, at 31.
27. John Somers, Notes of Debate, January 28, January 29, reprinted in 2 MISCELLANEOUS
STATE PAPERS: FROM 1501 TO 1726, at 417 (Philip Yorke & Earl of Hardwicke eds., London,
1778); see also 9 GREY, supra note 22, at 31. They may have heard of the complaints of Sir
Robert Atkyns, a judge, whose weapons, including the sword with which Charles II had
knighted him, were confiscated in 1683. See J.R. WESTERN, THE ENGLISH MILITIA IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL ISSUE, 1660-1802, at 4, 69 (1965) (citing
Public Record Office, "The Remarks of Sir Robert Atkyns," Cal. S.P. Dom., Reign of Charles II
(July-Sept. 1683) (London, 1934) at 402-03). Professor Malcolm may wish to correct her
citation from Western's Monarchy and Revolution to Western's The English Militia in the
Eighteenth Century. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 92 n.68.
28. 9 GREY, supra note 22, at 32; see also Somers, supra note 27, at 416-17.
29. Somers, supra note 27, at 410.
30. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 116.
31. See Somers, supra note 27.
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debates from 1667 to 1694,32 and a third by an anonymous compiler of
the debate of 28 January 1689.33 All three record that Finch, a former
solicitor general, was discussing the title to the throne, the subject of
the 28 January debate. Focusing on the legal complexities of the
vacancy of the throne caused by James II's flight, he was asking
members to consider whether the flight was a demise, an abdication,
or a desertion.34 Insisting that he was not excusing James II, Finch
declared (in Debates) that he looked with horror on the "invasion of
our Religion and Properties," and insisted (according to the
anonymous compiler) that he "own[ed] that [King James's] violations
were very great and that the taking up arms [against him] was
necessary."35  The compiler's account makes clear that the words
"defensive arms" in Somers' notes referred to the recent
engagements against the army of James II. Finch did not mention,
much less press for, an individual right to bear arms. His purpose in
the debate, as the three records show, was to urge the case for a
regency. It is impermissible, I submit, to interpret Finch's remark as
favoring the right of the individual to bear arms. I make the point, for
it shows that the right to arms was not regarded as significant enough
to be named in the 29 January debate when grievances and rights
were discussed.
On 2 February 1689, the committee presented its report, known
as the Heads of Grievances. 6 The report contained twenty-eight
Heads,37 three of which are pertinent to this discussion. One Head
(number 5) declared that "the Acts concerning the Militia are
grievous to the Subject." Another (number 6) held that the "raising
or keeping a Standing Army within this Kingdom in time of Peace,
unless it be with the Consent of Parliament, is against Law." The
third (number 7) declared that "it is necessary for the public Safety,
that the Subjects, which are Protestants, should provide and keep
Arms for their common Defence; and that the arms which have been
seized, and taken from them be restored." These military issues-the
militia, the standing army, and, mentioned for the first time, provision
32. See 9 GREY, supra note 22.
33. See Lois G. Schwoerer, A Jornall of the Convention at Westminster Begun the 22 of
January 1688/9, 44 BULL. INST. HIST. RES. 256, 258 (1976).
34. See 9 GREY supra note 22, at 18.
35. Id.; see also Schwoerer, supra note 33, at 258.
36. A copy of the Heads of Grievances is in SCHWOERER, supra note 18, app.2.
37. The committee brought in twenty-three Heads; five were added in the debate. See
Robert J. Frankle, The Formulation of the Declaration of Rights, 1689, 17 HIST. J. 265, 268
(1974).
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for the common defense-were clearly important to members of the
rights committee, for no other single topic was addressed in three
separate Heads.
Where did the idea of specifying a right of Protestant subjects to
possess arms for the common defense come from? The right was not
a component of an intellectual tradition, as was the antiarmy
prejudice and the promilitia sentiment. The Renaissance heritage,
known to all educated men through the works of Erasmus and Sir
Thomas More, satirized and condemned war and professional soldiers
and favored a system of citizen defense. Machiavelli argued that the
military threatens a people's liberty and that in a free state the citizen
militia should serve as the armed force. Citizens should be armed and
trained for service in the militia. James Harrington, the English
political theorist, wrote in great detail about military affairs in The
Commonwealth of Oceana, which influenced other writers, like Henry
Neville. 8 Harrington worked out a complicated scheme for the
militia, based on the wealth of the citizen. 39 An individual right to
arms was not considered.
There was no ancient political or legal precedent for the right to
arms. The Ancient Constitution4° did not include it; it was neither in
Magna Charta 1215 nor in the Petition of Right 1628. No early
English government would have considered giving the individual such
a right. Through the old militia laws-Henry II's Assize of Arms
(1181) and Edward I's Statute of Winchester (1285)-early
governments had imposed a responsibility on subjects, according to
their income, to be prepared to use arms against crime and in defense
of community and nation. In 1558, a Tudor law41 gave statutory
authority to the new office of lord-lieutenant of the county who was
almost always a peer, and, perhaps in 1559, certainly by 1569, the
lord-lieutenant was empowered to appoint a deputy-lieutenant,
usually a member of the gentry. The command of the militia was
placed in the hands of these two officers. 42  Although ultimate
38. See JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA AND A SYSTEM OF
POLITICS (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1992).
39. LOIS G. SCHWOERER, "No STANDING ARMIES!": THE ANTIARMY IDEOLOGY IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 15-18, 64-67 (1974).
40. For the classic study, see J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE
FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY. A REISSUE WITH A RETROSPECT (1987).
41. An Acte for the Taking Musters, reprinted in 4 THE STATUTES OF REALM 320-22
(London, 1817).
42. See GLADYS SCOTT THOMSON, LORDS LIEUTENANTS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
62-63, passim (1923).
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authority over the militia rested with the king and Privy Council,
actual supervision lay with the peerage and landed gentry.
Game Laws 43 also restricted gun possession. The earliest Game
Laws, starting in the fourteenth century, limited hunting to persons of
a certain wealth, because, it was observed later by King James I,
hunting was for gentlemen and "it is not fit that clowns should have
these sports."44 As a twentieth-century historian wittily remarked, the
laws "protect[ed] pheasants from peasants. ' 45 When guns came into
use, they were added to the list of prohibited weapons. The Game
Laws helped to protect the monarch and upper classes against
insurrection while at the same time defending their sport and game.
The Game Act of 1671 was the most exacting of all. For several
reasons, it contained highly restrictive measures; among them,
limiting the right to have a gun to persons with a freehold of at least
£100 a year, or a long term leasehold or copyhold of £150 per year, or
who were sons and heirs of persons of high degree.46 One may put
this figure in perspective by noting that the annual income of a
laborer in the period ranged from £9 to £15; the average income of a
temporal lord was estimated at £3,200.
41
Other laws also restricted the holding of guns. A nagging fear of
all early English governments was riot and social upheaval, and, in
the sixteenth century, Tudor monarchs took steps to control guns.
For example, an act of 1541, passed during the reign of Henry VIII,
limited the ownership of pistols less than a certain length and
crossbows to persons with an income of at least £100 and restricted
their use by such persons. 8 In 1548, a law of Edward VI required
people who "shoot guns" to register with their local justice. 49 In the
early seventeenth century, in 1616, King James I issued a
43. See P.B. MUNSCHE, GENTLEMEN AND POACHERS: THE ENGLISH GAME LAWS 1671-
1831, at 8-27 (1981).
44. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVER-
EIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 23 (1988).
45. Id.
46. For the terms, see THE STUART CONSTITUTION, 1603-1688: DOCUMENTS AND
COMMENTARY 457-58 (J.P. Kenyon ed., 2d ed. 1989). For the reasons, see MUNSCHE, supra
note 43, at 15-19.
47. See PETER LASLETr, THE WORLD WE HAVE LOST 36-37 (2d ed. 1972) (citing Gregory
King's calculations); KEITH WRIGHTSON, ENGLISH SOCIETY 1580-1680, at 34 (Rutgers Univ.
Press 1982).
48. An Acte Concerninge Crosbowes and Handguns, reprinted in 4 THE STATUTES OF THE
REALM, supra note 41, at 832-33.
49. An Acte Against the Shootinge of Hayle: The Act of Shott, reprinted in 4 THE STATUTES
OF THE REALM, supra note 41, at 58. Professor Malcolm may wish to correct the date she gives
for this act. See MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 10.
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proclamation to ban the sale and the wearing and carrying of
"[s]teelets, pocket daggers, picket Dagges and pistols" under pain of
imprisonment and censure in the Court of Star Chamber. He
described the weapons as "odious and noted Instruments of murther
and mischiefe" and declared that he preferred to prevent rather than
punish crime. 0 James I and Charles I vigorously enforced the Game
Laws.
There were objections and resistance to the Game Laws, but not
in terms of a demand for the right to possess arms. The right of the
individual to bear arms was no part of the Militia Bill debate in 1641.51
It did not figure in the proposals of the Levellers or Diggers, radicals
who might be expected to demand a radical right.52 Reformers at the
time of the Exclusion Crisis (1678-83) did not mention individual
arms as a right,53 nor did radical Whigs. 4 Men who tried to influence
members of the 1689 Convention by printing their ideas did not refer
to it.,,
But once, during the frenzy of Exclusion, parliamentary critics of
the government called for arming Protestants, not as a right, but to
protect the nation against Catholics. In the spring of 1679 an M.P.
wanted a law empowering the people to arm against a king who
wished to introduce popery.5 6 Although no one spoke of a right of the
individual to arm, members of the Commons did want to arm the
people for the practical purpose of preserving the nation from
Catholicism. Nothing came of this proposal nor of an address to the
king in December 1680 which asked for approval of an association
bill.57 The proposed bill was modeled on the Act of Association of
50. Proclamation of 1616, reprinted in 1 STUART ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS 359-60 (James
F. Larkin & Paul L. Hughes eds., 1973). A copy of the 1616 Proclamation is at the Folger
Shakespeare Library, STC 8539.8.
51. See SCHWOERER, supra note 39, at 33-50.
52. The Levellers' several Agreements of the People make no mention of the right to
possess arms. That right is not included in John Lilburne et al., An Agreement of the Free
People of England. Tendered as a Peace-Offering to This Distressed Nation, reprinted in THE
WRITINGS OF WILLIAM WALwYN 344 (Jack R. McMichael & Barbara Taft eds., 1989),
described as "the ultimate and full scope of all our desires and intentions." Id. at 345.
53. See B. Behrens, The Whig Theory of the Constitution in the Reign of Charles II, 7
CAMBRIDGE HIST. J. 42, 42-71 (1941); see also OW. Furley, The Whig Exclusionists: Pamphlet
Literature in the Exclusion Campaign, 1679-81, 13 CAMBRIDGE HIST. J. 19, 19-36 (1957).
54. See MELINDA S. ZOOK, RADICAL WHIGS AND CONSPIRATORIAL POLITICS IN LATE
STUART ENGLAND (1999).
55. See SCHWOERER, supra note 18, at 153-68; see also Mark Goldie, The Roots of True
Whiggism 1688-94, 1 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 195, 195-236 (1980).
56. See WESTERN, supra note 27, at 84.
57. See id.
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1581, which authorized the upper classes to unite for defense of
themselves and the nation were Queen Elizabeth I to be murdered.58
The idea, then, of giving individual Protestants the right to
provide and keep arms must have been a response to immediate
experience. It almost certainly came from members who may have
remembered the moves toward arming the populace taken a decade
before, and who had received rough treatment at the hands of a
zealous militia operating under the command of the king during the
two previous reigns. These had already expressed outrage in debate
(as we saw), and it is a near certainty that some among them
translated their anger into a right of Protestants to provide and keep
arms and into the demand that confiscated weapons should be
returned. Their actions well illustrate the historicity of interest in
specific rights; one historian has put it this way: "A right presupposes
a claim; if the claim is not made, the question of a right does not
arise."59  In other words, claims to specific rights emerged out of
practical political disputes, not abstract theoretical discussions. At
this stage in the drafting process of Article VII, members claimed this
right as necessary for the public safety and placed no qualifications on
it. This right was drafted, apparently, with hotheaded speed out of
deep rage over the treatment that some had endured. It was not a
carefully thought-out article, as the ready acceptance several days
later of the Lords' significant amendments indicates.
What did the committee mean by the word "Arms" (or
"Armes") that Protestants should "provide and keep"? According to
the Oxford English Dictionary, in the seventeenth century the word
meant, among other less pertinent things, "instruments of offence
used in war"; "Firearms: those for which gun powder is used, such as
guns and pistols as opposed to swords, spears or bows"; "defensive or
offensive outfit for war." 60 We may assume that the word was chosen
advisedly; obviously, another word could have been employed. If it is
objected that the term was hastily selected, even as the article was
hastily drafted, and no particular significance should be given it, it
may be rejoined that the committee took two weeks to amend that
article and during that time made a number of changes, but not to the
58. See id.
59. MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 81 (1973); Lois G. Schwoerer,
British Lineages and American Choices, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS GOVERNMENT PROSCRIBED 1,
3 & n.8 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1997).





The committee was heavily dominated by lawyers, men who by
training are sensitive to language and who may be expected to use
words that say what they mean. Why, then, did they select "Arms"?
I suggest that M.P.'s chose "Arms" to signal that they were not
providing a right to the individual subject to have a weapon for the
protection of himself, his family, or his house. In a predominantly
rural society, in a society that had no police force, many persons no
doubt had some kind of weapon-a club, an ax, a gun-for those
purposes. Malcolm apparently believes that English Protestants were
well fitted with guns in the Restoration period. 6 But the number of
subjects having a gun or other weapon for personal defense is beside
the point that the drafters of Article VII were making; they said that
Protestants "should provide and keep Arms for their common
defense.'62 These words implied a collective defense and evoked the
idea that ran through the seventeenth century that, ideally, a
reformed militia composed of Protestant freeholders and officered by
the local aristocracy was the "common defense" of the nation. Men
of substance, according to their wealth, provided arms for the militia
and kept them on hand to use as need arose. The militia was the
military instrument that would provide for public safety and serve as
a counterweight to a professional army-indeed the militia would
make a standing army unnecessary. Article VII was a kind of
reminder of the need for a reformed militia and reflected the concern
spelled out in Article V that the operation of the Restoration Militia
Act was grievous. That act had placed control of the militia in the
hands of the king and allowed him to use it to suppress dissidents,
including some M.P.'s.
Article V, of course, evoked memory of the use King Charles II
and King James II had made of the militia, and, by implication, so too
did Article VII. Furthermore, the use of the plural in "Subjects,
which are Protestants" and in "their common Defence" also suggests
that the drafters of Article VII were thinking of a collective, rather
than an individual right.
In sum, these features of the Article indicate that the
committee's silent reference point was the militia: first, the words "it
is necessary for the public Safety" evoked the arbitrary unreformed
militia condemned in debate and in Article V. Second, the words
61. See MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 79-86.
62. SCHWOERER, supra note 18, at 295.
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"the Subjects, which are Protestants, should provide and keep Arms
for their common Defence" signaled a reformed militia which would
protect the Protestant community. Professor Malcolm dismissed this
argument that the militia had anything to do with Article VII. She
argued that the militia was not mentioned in the Bill of Rights and
that in the amendment process the word "common" was dropped, as
we will see.63 But the militia was in the forefront of members' minds
as they drew up the list of grievances and rights. It was given first
place in the list of grievances that required new law. A reformed
militia was the ardent desire of many M.P.'s, and, in my view, the
language they chose for this first draft reflects that desire.
As the negotiations over this draft document proceeded,
significant changes were introduced. The Prince of Orange objected
to any provision that restricted the powers of the Crown, and under
pressure from him to "shorten" the list, the House of Commons
ordered the committee on 4 February to separate the Heads into two
categories-those that required new law and those that were a
reaffirmation of old law.64 Accordingly, on 7 February the committee
brought to the House of Commons the second draft of its report in
which several changes appeared. The Heads were now grouped into
two categories. Head V was about the militia and was given first
place in the category of issues requiring new law. There the demand
was made for "repealing the Acts concerning the Militia, and settling
it anew. ' 65 Head VI, about condemning standing armies in peacetime
without the consent of parliament, although it made new law, was
nonetheless kept in the category of reaffirming old law, no doubt to
make certain that this venerable grievance would not be lost in future
revisions. The language of Head VII was revised (as will be
discussed) and, although a new (but muted) law emerged, the article
was retained in the category of reaffirming old law.
Placing these two military clauses in the category of reaffirming
old law, when, in fact, they made new law (however faint in the case
of Article VII), was not a unique move. As I have shown elsewhere, 66
the Houses simply declared old law what they wanted to be old law
in a total of eight instances, nine instances if Head VII is added, as
Malcolm insists it should be. Malcolm faulted me for not including it
63. See id. at 119-20.
64. See 10 H.L. JOUR. 19 (1688). Frankle, supra note 37, at 265, 268-69 & n.25 stresses the
role of the Prince in the amendment process.
65. 10 H.C. JOUR. 22 (1688).
66. See, e.g., SCHWOERER, supra note 18, at 100, 283-84.
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in 1981 in my list of old laws that were really new.67 My view then and
now is that the only thing "new" in Head VII was that words in the
body of the Declaration of Rights (which, of course, commanded all
the articles), made the possession of arms by Protestants a right. The
Declaration of Rights spoke of "vindicating and asserting [the
nation's] ancient Rights and Liberties," and referred to the nation's
"undoubted Rights and Liberties." But the restrictive clauses added
later (and discussed below) returned this right to the practice of the
years prior to 1689-that is, the possession of guns was restricted to
upper-class Englishmen (since the Reformation, upper-class English
Protestants). In other words, arms possession and property were
linked, as they had been for centuries. Furthermore, the restrictive
clauses qualified the "right" so severely as to negate the very concept
of a "right." For those reasons, Article VII was not in my list. I agree
with Malcolm, however, that before 1689 the bearing of arms was not
described as a "right," and that making it a "right" was new, however
tempered by restrictive clauses.
Several alterations were also made to Article VII in the second
draft. First, the form of the verb was changed from "should provide
and keep arms" to "may provide and keep Arms.' '68 This change,
Malcolm believes, had two consequences: first, it made "having arms
a legal right"; and second, it "shifted the emphasis away from the
public duty to be armed and toward the keeping of arms solely as an
individual right. '69 Citing my work, she buttressed her point by
appealing to the idea that lawyers are sensitive to words and use them
to convey their precise meaning. I indeed do believe that lawyers are
sensitive to words and that they use them to convey a precise
meaning. However, in my view, Malcolm partly misinterpreted the
implications of the change in the verb form. While she is correct that
the form "may" conferred on Protestants legal permission to keep
arms if they chose to do so, I do not see that "may" shifted the
emphasis towards keeping arms as an individual right. There is no
change in the noun; "Subjects" remains in the plural. If an individual
right had been intended, those lawyers would have changed it to the
singular. Had they done so the sentence would have read: "That the
Subject, which is Protestant, may provide and keep Arms, for his
common Defence," and in that formulation, the notion that an
67. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 121-22.
68. It is interesting to note that Article VII is the only one in which the verb form "may"
occurs.
69. See MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 118.
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individual right was intended is arguably true. But members made no
such change and in my judgment the plural of the nouns is a ghost of
their intention to signal that their reference point remained the
militia. Finally, I hypothesize that the change was made to satisfy the
Prince of Orange who objected to the idea that Protestants "should
provide and keep Arms." As we will see, a few days later, William
opposed that notion of providing and keeping arms.
The second change to Article VII was to drop two phrases: one,
"it is necessary for the publick Safety" for Protestants to have arms;
and two, the "arms which have been seized, and taken from them be
restored." Although the record is silent about the reasons, and,
therefore, we cannot be sure, no doubt the words were removed
because the Prince of Orange's camp disapproved. Clearly, it was
insulting to his authority to say that it was necessary for the public
safety to arm Protestants. More subtly, the language was an implied
challenge to that authority. Further, it was palpably unfair to require
his government to restore the arms that had been confiscated by
previous kings. Finally, William and his friends would have objected
to a phrase about returning weapons when the charge of seizing them
could be leveled against him. Article VII now read: "That the
Subjects, which are Protestants, may provide and keep Arms, for
their common Defence."
A further decision was also reported on 7 February, namely, to
tidy up the Heads of Grievances and shape it into two sections. The
first section indicted King James II in thirteen particulars for
"endeavouring to extirpate the Protestant Religion, and the Lawes
and Liberties of his Kingdome. ' '70 The second section matched the
grievances generally with thirteen alleged "ancient rights." This
configuration of the Heads of Grievances was retained in the
Declaration of Rights. Moreover, in the 7 February debate the
question of linking the claim of rights to the offer of the throne was
raised for the first time, and during debate the next day, members
decided to do just that.', Then, on 8 February, following an order of
the House, the committee dropped the reforms requiring new law
from their draft and with that move, the Article V about militia
reform disappeared too.72 The proposed document was now ready to
submit to the House of Lords.
70. 10 H.C. JOUR. 21(1688).
71. See SCHWOERER, supra note 18, at 228-30.
72. See 10 H.C. JOUR. 23 (1688).
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From 9 February through 12 February the House of Lords,
assisted by a thirteen-member committee dominated by Williamite
peers, 73 amended the draft document that the House of Commons had
sent them. They made substantive changes to the language of the
military articles. Thus, urged on by an unidentified lord, the peers
added the words, "and quartering of soldiers, contrary to Law," to the
article about standing armies in the indictment section. 74  They
explained that free quarter was "proper to be added" as an
aggravation of a standing army and a violation of the petition of
Right.75 The move prompted sharp debate and the entry of a dissent
because some lords were reluctant to denounce King James II for an
action-quartering soldiers-that might be charged against the Prince
of Orange. But the proposer prevailed and the words were accepted
by the House of Commons.76 To another article in the indictment of
King James II, this one about disarming Protestants, the Lords added
the words "at the same time when Papists were both armed and
Employed contrary to Law. '77 This addition was also justified as a
"further aggravation" that strengthens the clause.78
The Lords also substantially amended Article VII. In the phrase
"provide and keep arms for their common defence" they substituted
the word "have" for "provide and keep" and deleted the word
"common. ' 79 I follow Malcolm's suggestion that both the House of
Lords and the Prince of Orange regarded the word "provide" as
"smack[ing] too much of preparation for popular rebellion" to be
accepted.80 But I dissent from her view that, by dropping the word
"common," the peers "claimed for the individual a right to be
armed."8 Rather, I think that the word "common" also conveyed the
idea of a national preparation for the kingdom's defense-as in a
reformed militia-and that the Prince was unwilling to accept. So, it
was dropped. Furthermore, their lordships added two phrases that
negated the notion of granting an individual right to have arms even
as they significantly qualified the idea of all Protestants having the
73. For a discussion of the Lords' rights committee, see SCHWOERER, supra note 18, at
237-43.
74. 14 H.L. JOUR. 122 (1685).
75. Id.
76. See 10 H.C. JOUR. 25 (1688).
77. 14 H.L. JOUR. 125 (1685).
78. 10 H.C. JOUR. 25 (1688).
79. Id.
80. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 119.
81. Id.
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right to possess arms: they were "suitable to their conditions" and "as
allowed by law. '82 These changes to Article VII were accepted
without recorded debate by the House of Commons on 12 February.
Article VII, as revised, now read: "That the Subjects which are
Protestants may have Armes for their defence Suitable to their
Condition and as allowed by Law." As is plain to see, the language of
Article VII had traveled a long way from its first formulation. The
words now qualified the right of the subject to have arms in three
respects: religion-must be Protestant; socioeconomic status-
"suitable to their condition"; and law-"as allowed by law." One
may ask: What kind of "right" is this that is so severely qualified as to
negate the very meaning of a "right"? Obviously, it is a far cry from
our understanding of a "right," but it would have been familiar to
persons in the Middle Ages. Then, and for centuries thereafter, a
right meant a power or authority that was exclusive-not held by
everyone. Such a right was dependent upon property, status, or gift.83
We cannot know for sure, but probably that understanding was in the
minds of the Lords who proposed the restrictions and, perhaps, of the
Commons who readily accepted them. What are we to make of these
limitations?
The first restriction on gun possession was religion-subjects
must be Protestants. Now, anyone familiar with the history of
sixteenth and seventeenth century England would expect that
members of the Convention would limit such an extraordinary right
as that of subjects to have arms for their defense to Protestants. The
limitation reflected the fear and loathing of Roman Catholics that had
grown and intensified in English society ever since the sixteenth
century Protestant Reformation. By the late seventeenth century,
anti-Catholic prejudice was deeply embedded in English culture. In
one Convention debate, Henry Pollexfen expressed the feeling of the
Assembly when he declared, "Popery is the fear of the nation."4
This prejudice had been nourished by a yearly church service of
thanksgiving for the timely discovery and foiling of the Gunpowder
Plot of 1605 and sharpened by the Popish Plot of 1678-1683, said to
be aimed at elevating a Catholic to the English throne. To rescue
England from a succession of popish kings, a virtual certainty with the
birth of King James II's son in June 1688, was one reason for the
82. Id.
83. See Schwoerer, supra note 59, at 4.
84. 9 GREY, supra note 22, at 34; cf. id. at 27.
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Revolution of 1688-89. English Protestants were outraged that King
Charles II and, even more, the Catholic King James II, had tried to
disarm the militia in Ireland, Scotland, and to a lesser extent in
England at the same time that they had disarmed Protestant
gentlemen.85 James II had also appointed Catholic officers to his
army and armed his Catholic subjects.16 As members of the rights
committee testified in debate, several of them had had their arms
confiscated and/or their houses searched. Their outrage was
palpable, as we saw. Language that evoked memory of these
incidents was insisted upon by the lords, who added the words "at the
same time when Papists were both armed and Employed contrary to
Law." The majority of English people despised and distrusted
Catholics. The point is that restricting the right to have arms to
Protestants was a reflection of Early Modern English prejudice
against Catholics. The second and third qualifiers were "suitable to
their [Subjects'] condition," and "as allowed by Law." Malcolm
confessed that she found it difficult to explain these amendments,
because they made "the assertion of a guaranteed right for
Protestants to have arms seems empty rhetoric."87 She resolved her
dilemma by recalling that "legislative reforms proposed by the
Convention, such as a modification of the Militia Act, had been left to
future parliaments. This meant," she reasoned, "[that] the arms
article declared a right that current law negated, with the
understanding that future legislation would eliminate the
discrepancy."' 8 There is no evidence in either the debates of 1689 or
the later legislative record that it was agreed in 1689 that "future
legislation would eliminate the discrepancy." In my view the
qualifiers conveyed precisely what members of the Convention
intended.
The restrictions may be explained by a short excursus into
English social history. The amendments reflected the social and
economic prejudices of upper-class English society, members of
which sat in the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The
structure of English society was hierarchical and stratified, with a tiny
minority at the top exercising enormous political, economic, and
85. See JOHN MILLER, JAMES 11: A STUDY IN KINGSHIP 211-12 (1977).
86. See id. See generally John Miller, The Militia and the Army in the Reign of James I1, 16
HIST. J. 659, 659-79 (1973).
87. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 120.
88. Id.
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social authority.89  It was a society based on inequality, one that
recognized social gradations and was sensitive to title, status, role,
and wealth. 90 A telling illustration of this point occurred in one of the
Convention debates, when a member, in an effort to make a partisan
political point, declared that the Convention represented no more
than a "4th part of the Nation."91 He explained that "there are
freeholders under 40 shillings a year & all Copyholders, & women &
Children & Servants" who have no share in parliamentary elections.92
This remark met with indignant rejoinders, one fellow member
protesting that "we represent the people fully" and speak for those
that have a share in government-"or are fit to have a share in it.""9
This response encapsulates the socially conservative view of the
Convention.
The social standing of the peers is obvious; perhaps we should
remind ourselves that members of the House of Commons enjoyed
high economic and social standing too. The rights committee in the
Lower House was composed almost entirely of leaders in
parliamentary, political and legal circles. Many were lawyers and
some had connections with members of the Lords' rights committee
either as friends, family, or business associates.94 The first chairman
of the Commons rights committee was Sir George Treby (1634-1700),
a lawyer and past Recorder of London. The second chairman, John
Somers (1651-1716), also a lawyer, was a writer of influential political
tracts, junior counsel (he was thirty-seven years old) for the Seven
Bishops at their trial in June 1688, and after the English Revolution,
Lord Chancellor. Such people as these were sensitive to the dangers
implicit in allowing all Protestants to have arms. There was even a
recent incident that might have been in the forefront of their minds:
that is the rampaging of a Protestant mob in London in December
1688, which had caused property and personal damage.95
Equally to the point is that the possession of arms had always
89. See, e.g., WRIGHTSON, supra note 47, ch. 1. See also the classic study by LASLETF,
supra note 47, chs. 1, 2, 8.
90. See id.
91. Schwoerer, supra note 33, at 252.
92. Id. at 253.
93. Id. at 254-55.
94. For relationships with peers, see SCHWOERER, supra note 18, at 39. Five sons of peers
were on the committee. Id.
95. See generally Tim Harris, London Crowds and the Revolution of 1688, in BY FORCE OR
BY DEFAULT? THE REVOLUTION OF 1688-1699, at 44-64 (Eveline Cruickshanks ed., 1989);
Robert Beddard, Anti-Popery and the London Mob, 38 HIST. TODAY 36, 36-39 (1988); William
Sachse, The Mob and the Revolution of 1688, 4 J. BRIT. STUD 23, 23-40 (1964).
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been associated with property and/or income. Subjects' military
obligations had been equated with their socioeconomic status in the
militia laws going back to the twelfth century, as we have seen. The
customs and laws governing both the militia and the feudal array
reflected hierarchical social values and fear of arming the lower
classes. Weapons in the hands of the "people" were closely regulated
by law. The Militia Act of 1662 continued the principle set out in
earlier militia laws that specified the individual's obligation according
to one's estate. It is no wonder that the House of Commons should
have accepted without recorded dissent the two qualifiers introduced
by the House of Lords.
Further, the attitude of equating weapons and property was
reflected in papers of two members of the Convention. Thomas Erle
(c. 1650-1720), a member of the House of Commons and an
opponent of standing armies, was interested in reforming the militia
to prevent an arbitrary monarch from using it for corrupt purposes
against his perceived enemies. In a manuscript entitled Paper of
Instructions for the Parliament Meeting after the Revolution and
written probably in early December 1688, Erle spelled out his ideas
for protecting the nation.96 There should be no standing army, and no
English monarch should have more guards than did Queen Elizabeth
I, King James I, and King Charles I.97 The militia should be reformed,
and only persons of wealth were to serve, for such men had
something to lose and could be trusted, Erle believed.98 In addition to
the militia he recommended that men in the counties with an income
of £10 and substantial property holders in towns and cities should be
provided with a "good musket" to protect the nation against
invasion.99 That idea would have required an amendment to the
Game Law of 1671 (discussed below), but Erle argued that other laws
protected game, and, sounding like a late-twentieth-century defender
of guns, declared that a gun was not to blame for the destruction of
game, but the person who misused it. It is not certain that Erle
presented his ideas in debate, but since he wrote them out, it is likely.
Philip Wharton, fourth Baron Wharton (1613-1696), a Whiggish
member of the House of Lords, also left papers setting out his ideas
96. Mark Goldie, Thomas Erie's Instructions for the Revolution Parliament, December
1688, 14 PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 337, 337-47 (1995); see also ScHWOERER, supra note 18, at 77,
192.
97. See Goldie, supra note 96, at 337-47.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 344-45.
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on remodeling the government, including the militia. Among the
points he made was that only freeholders who had an annual income
of at least £20 or held a copyhold for life of £30 were to serve in the
militia. 1°° Equating arms and property is a basic assumption in
Wharton's thought, even as it was in Erle's. In neither case was an
unrestricted individual right to arms under consideration. Thus, in
debate and in surviving papers, members of the Convention made it
clear that two qualifications for Protestants to have a gun was their
social status and economic condition.
The other qualification for possessing arms introduced by the
House of Lords was "as allowed by law." What did the peers mean
by this phrase? There seem to be two overlapping strands comprising
the point the peers were making. Foremost in their minds, I think,
were the old Militia Laws and Game Laws, especially the Game Act
of 1671, both of which restricted the possession of weapons to the
wealthy. The lords knew well the provisions of the Game Act of
1671, for three members of their rights committee had served on the
committee to which the Game Bill was referred in 1671.01 So too did
members of the rights committee in the House of Commons, for four
of them had initiated that Game Bill.102 Members of both Houses had
reason to preserve their hunting privileges and game and to fear the
threat to property and person from placing arms in the hands of all
Protestants. In Article VII, they specified that having guns was to be
limited according to law, that is by the laws already on the books that
restricted guns to upper-class Englishmen.
At the same time, their lordships were underscoring with this
restriction the law-making role of parliament. Professor Carl Bogus
has insightfully argued that the words were intended to mean that
parliament, as the principal law-making body, had the authority to
decide which Protestants might have guns.03 Bogus reasoned that the
phrase "as allowed by law" invited the question: who makes law?1°4
Members of the Convention (which was concerned with doing all it
could to achieve the sovereignty of parliament) would have certainly
answered: parliament. Parliament, of course, had been regulating
100. Philip Wharton, [untitled paper] (n.d.), Bodleian Library, Carte MSS 81, fol. 766.
Although untitled and undated, internal evidence establishes that it was written around January
of 1689. The terms of the paper are discussed further in SCHWOERER, supra note 18, at 238-39.
101. See generally MUNSCHE, supra note 43, at 15.
102. See id.
103. See Carl Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
311,383-85 (1998).
104. Id. at 384.
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who might have weapons, including guns, for centuries in the Militia
Laws and Game Laws. Recently they had done so in the Game Act
of 1671. Surely they would do so in the future. In other words, the
phrase "as allowed by law" invited recognition of parliament's law-
making authority in the past, the present, and the future.
Interestingly, the language does not specify "English men," but
rather says "Subjects which are Protestants." Thus, logically,
properly qualified English women-that is Protestant women of
wealth, who as widows held property of appropriate value would be
allowed to have arms also. In this instance, then, the prejudices of
religion, status, and economic standing trumped the prejudice against
the female.
In sum, I maintain that Article VII was erected on prejudices:
religious, social, and economic. Reflecting social and economic
snobbery, Article VII preserved the interests of the upper-class
Protestant landowner. It was erected on law-class law that
protected the interests of the well-to-do. The phrase "as allowed by
law" may also have signaled the intention that parliament have the
authority to make future law regarding who might possess guns.
Article VII is properly regarded not as a gun-rights law, but as a gun-
control measure. It gives no right to all Protestants to possess guns; it
gives that right to upper-class Protestants. In effect, it armed a small
minority-perhaps no more than three percent-of the population.
This, I submit, was the original meaning of Article VII.
II
What happened to this restrictive right immediately following the
Revolution? If we are to believe Joyce Malcolm, members intended
to "eliminate the discrepancy" of restrictions in Article VII, and "by
the early eighteenth century legislation and court interpretation had
made it clear that an individual right to bear arms belonged to all
Protestants.' '15 No evidence, presented by Professor Malcolm or
otherwise uncovered, convincingly supports this argument. Malcolm
offered three examples.
First was the 13 March 1689 debate over disarming Catholics. 1°6
The Convention had been transformed into the Convention
Parliament at the end of February, and the same members were now
105. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 122.
106. See id.
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sitting to take up the pressing issues that confronted the new
government. 107 For some members, nothing was more important than
protecting the nation against gun-owning Catholics. In debate on
doing so, an M.P. remarked that "a way to convict" persons of
Catholicism must be contrived else "you cannot disarm them." 1°
Malcolm reasoned that "this statement implies that the House clearly
meant the new right to have arms to include all Protestants, whatever
their condition." 109  In my view the comment cannot carry that
conclusion. The debate was on disarming Catholics; neither
Protestants nor an unrestricted right of all of them to have arms was
mentioned. If such a right had been intended only a month after
crafting Article VII, surely it would have provoked comment. But
the bill disarming Catholics passed without any comment. The law
gave Catholics permission to keep "necessary Weapons" for personal
defense, as the Justice of the Peace would allow. The allowance
reinforces my point that the Convention was guaranteeing a right to
certain carefully identified persons to keep "arms" suitable for
offensive and defensive warfare; it was not giving a constitutional
guarantee to have a weapon for personal defense.
Malcolm's second example was reform of the militia. 110
Beginning in July 1689 and continuing in the autumn of 1690, M.P.'s
made repeated attempts to draft a Militia Bill. 1' Their efforts to
reform the militia met with failure: unsettled conditions and King
William's opposition doomed the project.112  Malcolm saw a
connection between militia reform and the right to possess arms in
the failure of militia reform. "Insistence on the principle of a right to
be armed," she wrote, "must have seemed adequate protection
against forcible disarmament by the militia.""' 3 She explained that Sir
William Williams (1634-1700) willingly delayed reform on those
grounds." 4 But Malcolm gave no evidence to show the existence of
an "insistence" on the principle of an arms right nor of Williams's
interest in that principle. By contrast, J.R. Western, the militia
107. See Lois G. Schwoerer, The Transformation of the Convention into a Parliament,
February 1689, 3 PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 57, 57-76 (1984).
108. 5 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 183 (London, 1806).
109. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 123.
110. See id.
111. See WESTERN, supra note 27, at 85-89.
112. See id. at 87-88.
113. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 125.
114. See id. at 208 n.25.
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historian, explained Williams's willingness to delay militia reform due
to his sense of urgency that the nation must move against Catholics
whatever the condition of the militia.11 In my view, M.P.'s handling
of militia reform does not advance Professor Malcolm's argument.
What the story of attempted militia reform does show is that
militia reform-and not allowing all Protestants the right to possess
guns-was what seriously engaged the attention of members of the
Convention Parliament. If M.P.'s had wanted to modify the
restrictions in Article VII, they would have taken the time to do so,
just as they took the time to introduce bills about the militia. They
had other opportunities, of which they did not avail themselves, when
over the next eight months or so the Declaration of Rights was
transformed into the Bill of Rights. During that process the
Declaration was amended, 116 but Article VII was not touched. It
cannot be said that the committee of eleven members elected on 5
March to manage that transformation was unfamiliar with the details
of the Declaration. Eight persons who had served on the rights
committees for the Declaration, including Somers and Treby, were
elected to the Bill of Rights committee.117 The proper conclusion is
that members ignored Article VII deliberately, because it was not
part of their intention to remove the restrictions.
The third "proof" that Malcolm offered was the Game Act of
1693.118 Stressing that guns were not specifically included in the list of
prohibited devices, although admitting that they may have been
included under "other instruments," Malcolm declared that "the
Whigs ... fought" to assure of the right of gun ownership for all
Protestants.1" 9 The "committee," she continued, introduced a rider at
the third reading "to enable every Protestant to keep a musket in his
House for his defence, not withstanding this or any other Act."1 20 It is
true that Whigs played a primary role in promoting the rider, but
Whig leaders did not take the initiative and the amendment was not a
"committee" measure. Rather, the rider was presented by "Mr.
115. See WESTERN, supra note 27, at 85.
116. See SCHWOERER, supra note 18, ch. 16.
117. See id. at 268.
118. Malcolm gives the date as 1692, using Old Style dating in this instance. See MALCOLM,
supra note 2, at 126. The bill moved through the House of Commons in February 1693, New
Style. See 10 H.C. JOUR. 801, 805, 807, 824 (1692).
119. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 126.
120. The quotation is from 10 H.C. JOUR. 824, not from HENRY HORWITZ, THE
PARLIAMENTARY DIARY OF NARCISSUS LUTTRELL, 1691-1693, at 444 (1972), as Malcolm's
notes show. See Malcolm, supra note 2, at 209 n.36.
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Norris"-no doubt Thomas Norris (1653-1700) who was on the
committee, and a Whig to be sure, but "an inactive Member"-no
leader. 121 Of the four men who supported Norris, only one was from
the committee-Anthony Bowyer (1633-1709)-described as voting
"steadily as a court Whig," which was not true in this case. 122 These
men argued that the rider promoted the security of the government
and that all Protestants should be able to defend themselves. 123 The
"majority Tory party," Malcolm said, opposed the rider. True again
that Sir Christopher Musgrave and Sir Joseph Tredenham, both
Tories, led the debate against the rider. But significantly Sir John
Lowther, a Court Whig, joined them, and we can be sure that King
William and his friends would not have allowed it to pass. These men
insisted that the measure was irregular, one saying that it "savours of
the politics to arm the mob, which ... is not very safe for any
government. ' 124 One may reasonably think that such considerations
animated Musgrave and Tredenham (who had served on the rights
committee) just four years earlier when Article VII was being
drafted. In any case, the rider was decisively defeated 169 to 65,125
leaving no doubt that, while minority sentiment for arming all
Protestants existed, a decisive majority opposed both it and the
notion of modifying the terms of Article VII. By the early eighteenth
century, Article VII and the assumptions underlying it remained
intact.
III
Whereas no claim of the right of the subject to have arms was
raised before the Revolution of 1688-89, such claims for Protestants
were raised during the eighteenth century. They appeared in law
cases when a defendant protested being denied a gun, or in tracts at
moments of crisis, as, for example, during the run-up to the Militia
121. Horwitz identifies the participants in this exchange. HORWITZ, supra note 120, at 444.
For comment, see 3 BASIL DUKE HENNING, THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT. THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS 1660-1690, at 148 (1983). See also HENRY HORWITZ, PARLIAMENT, POLICY AND
POLITICS IN THE REIGN OF WILLIAM III 338 (1977).
122. 1 HENNING, supra note 121, at 696.
123. See HORWITZ, supra note 120, at 444. The other three were: the Honorable Goodwin
Wharton (1653-1704), an eccentric, known as an "influential" Whig at this time (see 3
HENNING, supra note 121, at 695-96); Mr. Howe, impossible to identify because one of three
"Howes" in the Parliament; and Mr. Clarke, probably Sir Gilbert Clarke (c. 1645-1701), a Tory
(see 2 HENNING, supra note 121, at 82).




Bill of 1757, or in parliamentary debate at the time of the Gordon
Riots in 1780. As long as there was a threat of foreign invasion from
France, Jacobite uprising, or papist coup d'etat, some persons would
argue for allowing all Protestants to have guns. But, as the historian
of the Game Laws has remarked, "the spirit of the Game Laws...
was very much alive in the eighteenth century" and grew stronger
over the century. 126 In fact, court decisions and claims did not prevent
the Game Acts from being enforced, albeit fitfully, depending upon
the attitude of the local gentry' 27 nor eliminate further claims to the
right to have arms. These facts alone demonstrate that a
constitutional right for all Protestants to have arms was not achieved
by the end of the eighteenth century.
Changes that occurred were in the Game Laws, not in Article
VII of the Bill of Rights. Thus, the Game Act of 1706 omitted guns
from the list of prohibited weapons, this time deliberately. According
to a later account of the debate, a contemporary member of
Parliament who participated in the discussions objected to including
guns because "it might be attended with greate inconvenience."' 128 A
gun, it was said, is "frequently necessary to be kept and used for other
purposes, as the killing of noxious vermin and the like.' 1 29 But when
used for killing game, then a gun fell under the law.
Decisions in two cases, Rex v. Gardner in 1739,130 and Wingfield
v. Stratford and Osman in 1752,13, reinforced the legality of an
individual to have a gun.132 The court ruled for the defendant charged
with gun possession. In both instances, the court accepted the
defense argument that a gun was needed for personal defense or "for
a farmer to shoot crows.' 13 3 These two cases apparently were the only
pertinent ones, for Malcolm neither discusses nor cites any others. 34
These two rulings favoring gun possession, however, did not put
the matter to rest. After each case, outrage that guns were being
126. MUNSCHE, supra note 43, at 32.
127. See id. at 80-82.
128. 1 RICHARD BuRN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER: BY RICHARD
BURN, CLERK, ONE OF HIS MAJESTY'S JUSTICES OF THE PEACE FOR THE COUNTY OF
WESTMORLAND 442-43 (London, 1755).
129. Id.
130. 93 Eng. Rep. 1056 (K.B. 1739).
131. 96 Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B. 1752).
132. See MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 129.
133. Id.
134. Malcolm wrote of a "series of court cases" and of "several law cases" but identified
only two. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 128-29.
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taken from subjects appeared: The Craftsman complained in 1739
that pheasants and partridges were being preserved at "the imminent
Hazard of our Liberties. ' 135  In 1755, John Shebbeare, a Tory
polemicist, critical of the government's slowness to proceed with
militia reform, wrote a series of letters to and about the English, in
which he fumed against the Game Laws for depriving people of Arms
to defend themselves, making them "slaves by robbing [them] of the
power of resistance.' 136 He said it was a "breach" of the Bill of Rights
to disarm the populace. 137 He and other Tories (such as William
Beckford and John Brown) bitterly attacked the use of standing
armies and foreign troops, condemned the denial of arms to the
people, and demanded a national militia.3 8 They appropriated the
anger over that denial and used it as a propaganda ploy, even as the
antimilitary ideology had been used during the Restoration. Tories
and Patriot Whigs pressed hard for arming the people for service in a
militia, which they confidently predicted would remove the need for
and rid the country of German mercenaries and also train the nation
in civic virtue. Public opinion, thus aroused, propelled William Pitt to
power and led to the passage of the Militia Bill. Ironically, the new
militia, although driven by popular and libertarian sentiments, proved
unpopular in the event, provoked serious riots, and influenced the
nature of political alignments. 13 9 The point is that printed tracts
concerning the Militia Bill of 1757 illustrate the polemical uses of
claiming a right to arm.
The Gordon Riots of 1780 were another example of occasions
that provoked outbursts of vehement support for the principle of the
right of the individual to possess arms. The context 140 was this: The
government of Lord North had fallen under increasingly sharp
criticism because of military reverses in America and serious
135. MUNSCHE, supra note 43, at 80.
136. JOHN SHEBBEARE, A FIFTH LETTER TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND, ON THE
SUBVERSION OF THE CONSTITUTION: AND THE NECESSITY OF ITS BEING RESTORED 35 (1757);
cf. id. at 34. The same point was made even more passionately in JOHN SHEBBEARE, A LETTER
TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND, ON THE PRESENT SITUATION AND CONDUCT OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS 16 (1755).
137. JOHN SHEBBEARE, A THIRD LETTER TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND 49,56 (1756).
138. See ELIJAH H. GOULD, THE PERSISTENCE OF EMPIRE: BRITISH POLITICAL CULTURE
IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 46,51, 82 (2000).
139. See id. at 75, 79, 81, 84, 86, 89.
140. For brief review, see WILLIAM B. WILLCOX & WALTER L. ARNSTEIN, THE AGE OF
ARISTOCRACY 1688 TO 1830, at 182-84 (1966). See also T.A. CRITCHLEY, THE CONQUEST OF
VIOLENCE: ORDER AND LIBERTY IN BRITAIN 81-90 (1970); CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, KING
MOB: THE STORY OF LORD GEORGE GORDON AND THE LONDON RIOTS OF 1780 (1958).
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problems with France, Spain, and neutral nations. The opposition,
under the leadership of such men as Charles James Fox, became
radical and factious. In 1778, in an effort to motivate Catholics to
enlist in the army, North's government promoted the passage of the
Catholic Relief Act, which removed several disabilities from
Catholics. Tapping into the deep vein of anti-Catholicism, the
Protestant Association, led by its president, the erratic Lord George
Gordon, young son of a Scottish noble, organized a mass petition said
to contain 120,000 signatures for the repeal of the Act. When
Parliament refused an immediate hearing, the crowds gathered
outside Westminster turned angry. Violence soon spread through the
city. From Friday, 2 June to the following Thursday, 8 June, great
damage was done to Catholic chapels, houses, and businesses; over
300 people were killed in the melee, and more were injured. Some
cities in the counties also erupted in riot and mayhem. Order was not
restored until the army was finally ordered to act. An army officer,
Jeffrey Lord Amherst, commanded his lieutenant colonel in London
to disarm all residents except those in the militia and others
specifically designated to defend the city. Charles Lennox, the third
Duke of Richmond, responded indignantly to this move. In speeches
in the House of Lords later in the month he charged that the Bill of
Rights guaranteed that "every Protestant subject shall be permitted
to arm himself for his personal security, or for the defence of his
property."'1 41 He moved that the order of the army officer be branded
as "unwarrantable" because it had violated the "sacred right" of
Protestant subjects "to have arms for their defence, suitable to their
conditions, and as allowed by law. ' 142 Although Malcolm makes
much of Richmond's remarks, 43 it is clear that in his confused speech
he ultimately claimed nothing different from the restricted right
allowed by Article VII. The Earl of Carlisle, Lord Stormont, and the
Lord Chancellor defended the army's actions and Richmond's motion
was defeated.
Protests favoring the right of Protestant subjects to be armed
were heard outside of Parliament. In the summer of 1780, the
Yorkshire Association condemned any attempt "to disarm peaceable
subjects" who were Protestant.'" When asked to give his opinion in
July 1780, the recorder of London registered his approval of the
141. 21 COBBETT, supra note 108, at 727.
142. Id. at 728.
143. See MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 131.
144. For what follows, see GOULD, supra note 138, at 173-76.
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associations and of the right of Protestants individually to have arms
"and to use them for lawful purposes." It was a right, he said, which
"may, and in many cases must, be exercised collectively."'' Malcolm
regards his remarks as "perhaps the clearest summation of the right
of Englishmen to have arms" at that time.146 On the other hand, the
recorder's use of the words "for lawful purposes" and his reference to
"exercising" the right "collectively" may signal that he wanted to
guarantee the right of individual Protestants to be armed so that they
might serve effectively in the associations. In any case, these remarks
did not end the matter. Two years later, an anonymous tract,
Dialogue Between a Scholar and a Peasant, written by William Jones
in 1782, again regretted that Englishmen did not have guns and urged
them to be prepared-that is, armed-to defend themselves in
associations against the government. 47 The tract was published by
the radical Society for Constitutional Information and translated into
Welsh.148 These moves provided powerful propaganda. But the
moment passed; people turned away from extralegal activities,
disavowed radicalism, and lost interest. The government took charge
and the associations in the counties and in London dissolved. Jones
was charged with libel and sedition.149 The fervent expressions of the
right of the individual Protestant to be armed came to nothing.
Further to support her thesis, Malcolm called upon two great
figures in English history, the jurist, William Blackstone, and the
historian, Thomas Lord Macaulay. She declared that in his famous
Commentaries on the Law of England, Blackstone endorsed the Whig
view that "armed citizens [sic] were a necessary check on tyranny"
and in doing so transformed the view into "orthodox opinion."15 0 It is
true that Blackstone identified the right of the subject to have arms as
the fifth "auxiliary right" in protecting freedom, but he was not
talking about an unrestricted right. He wrote:
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject.., is that of having
arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and
such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same
statute 1 William and Mary and is indeed a public allowance, under
due restraints, of the natural right of resistance and self-
preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found
145. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 134.
146. Id.
147. See GOULD, supra note 138, at 173-74, 176.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 176.
150. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 129-30.
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insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression."'
Clearly, Blackstone not only quoted from Article VII but named
the Bill of Rights. He summed up by describing the five auxiliary
rights as birthrights, "unless where laws of our country have laid them
under necessary restraints.' '52 In his view, the right of the subject to
have arms existed under "due restraints" as spelled out in the Bill of
Rights. That right applies, he added, only "when the sanctions of
society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of
oppression. ' 15 3 Blackstone was not advocating an unrestricted right
of the individual to have arms. I agree with Malcolm that
Blackstone's remarks are "of the utmost importance" because his
Commentaries played such a significant role in both England and the
colonies. 5 4  That being the case, it is of utmost importance to
understand aright what he wrote.
In a different way, Macaulay's views carry an importance equal
to those of Blackstone. Quoting a passage from Macaulay's Critical
and Historical Essays, Contributed to the Edinburgh Review,155
Malcolm contended that Macaulay advocated the idea that "the
Englishman's ultimate security depended not upon the Magna Carta
or Parliament but upon the power of the sword.1156 It is true that in a
review of Henry Hallam's The Constitutional History of England,
from the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of George H, Macaulay
had written: "The great security, the security without which every
other would have been insufficient, was the power of the sword." '157
But Macaulay was not arguing for the subject's right to have arms in
this remark. Rather, he was discussing the mounting conflict in 1640-
41 between Charles I and the parliamentary leaders over the power of
the sword, a dispute that moved inexorably towards the passage of
the Militia Bill/Ordinance 5 8 and the outbreak of war. His point was
that each side understood the importance of the Militia
Bill/Ordinance because the result would place command of the armed
forces in the hands of Parliament. I know of no place where
151. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 139 (Stanley
N. Katz ed., 1979).
152. Id. at 140.
153. Id. at 139.
154. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 130,142-43.
155. 1 THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS, CONTRIB-
UTED TO THE EDINBURGH REvIEw 154, 162 (1850).
156. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at x, 169, 176.
157. MACAULAY, supra note 155, at 159.
158. See SCHWOERER, supra note 39, ch. 2.
[Vol. 76:27
TO HOLD AND BEAR ARMS: THE ENGLISH PERSPECTIVE
Macaulay subscribed to an unrestricted right of the subject to have
arms. In fact, he does not even mention the restricted right to arms
provided by Article VII in his magisterial History of England.
IV
The climax of Joyce Malcolm's argument is that an individual
right to have arms was a heritage of the Bill of Rights that
"Englishmen took with them to the American colonies."'15 9 It was a
legacy that "Americans fought to protect in 1775."160 This heritage,
Malcolm contends, had a defining influence on the Second
Amendment. The "public" found reassurance when the First
Congress "copied English policies"; it was not satisfied "until passage
of the Second Amendment.' 161  In the Second Amendment,
Americans went beyond the model provided by Article VII; they
removed the restrictions, forbidding "any infringement" upon the
right to have arms.162 Malcolm maintains that the account in her book
"is the key to the meaning and intent of the much-misunderstood
Second Amendment. 1 63
There is much that is problematic about these assertions. First,
Malcolm supplies no notes to them. She does not define "people"
nor give proof of the attitude that she assigns them. What evidence is
there that the people wanted the Congress to copy English policies or
that their "concern" was "not allayed until the passage of the Second
Amendment?" What evidence is there that the English Bill of
Rights' provision for "individuals to have arms" was before the
members of the First Congress? Where is there comment about
removing the restrictions in Article VII to ensure no "infringement"
on the right to have arms? While everyone might agree that the
English Bill of Rights was of central importance to the colonists,164
and that members of the First Congress were familiar with all its
provisions, the fact is that the record of the debates, the
correspondence, and other documents relating to the creation of the
American Bill of Rights contains no direct reference to Article VII.
159. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at 134.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 151.
162. Id. at 162.
163. Id. at 150-51.
164. It has been said that with Magna Carta and the Petition of Right the Bill of Rights
formed the "models in hand, or at least in mind" when the colonists drew up their claim.
Schwoerer, supra note 59, at 2.
20001
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
When delegates refer to arming the people, they do so in the context
of assuring a reliable militia, discussing the question of conscientious
objectors, or expressing strong objections to a standing, professional
army.165
One may suggest that the absence of reference to Article VII and
its right of the subject to have arms under restrictions reflects the fact
that the article had no relevance to American needs. How could it?
The status of the constitutional right of the individual to hold arms in
English law in 1789, at the time of the meetings held in Philadelphia
to draft the American Bill of Rights, remained the terms of Article
VII. Those terms had not been changed since the Bill of Rights
became law in November 1689. Over the intervening one hundred
years, no one had stepped forward to introduce an amendment
bringing Article VII into conformity with what Professor Malcolm
believes to have been the intention of the members of the
Convention. True, over the years, voices were raised, tracts written,
and two law cases decided in favor of the right of the individual to
have a gun. These expressions of opinion, however, did not represent
majority public opinion nor did they rise to the level of constitutional
change. In some instances, the charge that the government disarmed
subjects and disallowed them the right to have arms was a
propaganda ploy that critics used against the government. It is clear
that people may declaim and express their outrage over an issue in
parliamentary debate, they may print tracts and pamphlets insisting
upon their viewpoint, two law cases may decide an issue in ways that
please such people. But, none of these things create a constitutional
right. The constitutional right of the individual to hold arms at the
end of the eighteenth century was what it was at the beginning-a
restricted right. If the Americans ignored all these restrictions, as
Malcolm claims, then they were not following the English
constitutional example. Logically, she contradicts her own thesis in
making that claim.
In point of fact, however, the Americans did follow the English,
but not in the way Malcolm thinks. The Americans, like the English,
favored the militia, and wrote an awkwardly worded amendment that
would assure that the militia would be appropriately armed by the
individuals who served in it.
165. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS 4, 12, 17, 19, 22, 30, 38-39, 48 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
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V
This Article began with the hope that, in offering an
interpretation different from that of Professor Malcolm, it might
clarify and illuminate the English intellectual and constitutional
antecedents and the meaning of the much disputed Second
Amendment to our Constitution. In my view, To Keep and Bear
Arms is a well-written study that advances its argument in compelling
terms, sometimes in unguarded language. But, despite the trappings
of historical scholarship, the analysis of text and context is sometimes
open to question, the research is not meticulous, and the argument is
not irrefutable. In offering a different view, I contend that English-
men did not secure to "ordinary citizens" the right to possess
weapons. Article VII of the Bill of Rights did secure the right to have
arms to English subjects, according to their religion, as was "suitable"
to their economic standing, and "according to the law" that governed
such matters-in other words to upper-class Protestants. The Article
is an excellent example of class law and of law erected on religious,
social, and economic prejudices. It was a reaction to the policies of
King Charles II and his Catholic brother, King James II, and reflected
the hatred of standing armies in time of peace and the conviction that
the militia, as an instrument that was effectively controlled by
parliament and the upper classes, could provide a safeguard against
standing armies and an absolute king. Drafted by upper-class
Protestants who had their own interests at heart, Article VII was a
gun control measure. Throughout the eighteenth century, protests
against disarming subjects and fervent assertions that the right of gun
possession applied to every Protestant appeared at moments of crisis
and sometimes were used as a propaganda weapon against the
government. Despite these moves, the government continued to
restrict possession of guns. At the end of the eighteenth century,
after winning the war against Great Britain, the colonists drew up a
written constitution and soon thereafter added to it a series of
amendments. The delegates to the First Congress knew the English
precedents, including Article VII; some delegates insisted that they
laid claim to all the rights of Englishmen. But there is no evidence
that they regarded Article VII as the source of the Second
Amendment to their own Bill of Rights. Why should they have, when
that Article restricted a right to guns in ways entirely unacceptable to
them? In short, Professor Malcolm's book did not, as she claimed,
"set the American controversy over the meaning of the Second
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Amendment ... upon a foundation of fact."'166 The fact is, there was
no unrestricted English right of the individual to possess guns for the
colonists to inherit.
166. MALCOLM, supra note 2, at x.
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